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Abstract
This article describes the real quality of Pattani Central Mosque to depict
another picture of mosques in southern Thailand that has been alleged as an
arena for the spreading of Islamic radical ideas and the recruiting of young
people into ‘martyrs’ against the Thai Government. It is not doubted, the
2004 Kru-ze Mosque incident reflects the failure of places of worship as a
‘sanctuary from violence’. Consequently, there are questions about the kind
of practices taking place in Islamic teaching, mosque management, and the
views held by mosque stakeholders (Imam, the preachers, and congregation)
toward good governance, human rights and the anticipation of radicalism
given the current situation in Pattani. In sum, Pattani Central Mosque instead
seems to be composed of a fairly equal mixture of moderate and more conser-
vative believers rather than those with radical and extreme tendencies.
1 This article is modified of my thesis research “Examining Pattani Central Mosque:
Islamic Teaching Practices and Views of Good Governance, Human Rights and Anticipa-
tion for Radicalism” for Master of Human Rights and Democratisation of Sydney Univer-
sity, Australia, and Mahidol University, Thailand.
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Artikel ini mendeskripsikan kualitas yang nyata dari Masjid Raya Pattani untuk
mengilustrasikan gambaran lain tentang masjid-masjid di Thailand Selatan yang
disinyalir sebagai arena penyebaran ide-ide Islam radikal dan rekruitmen or-
ang–orang muda sebagai “martir” melawan Pemerintah Thailand. Tidak
terbantahkan, insiden Masjid Kru-ze tahun 2004 merefleksikan kegagalan tempat-
tempat ibadah sebagai ‘sanctuary from violence’. Akibatnya, terdapat sejumlah
pertanyaan mengenai jenis-jenis praktik pengajaran, manajemen masjid dan
pandangan dari para pengelola/takmir masjid (Imam, juru dakwah, and jemaah)
terhadap pemerintahan yang baik, hak asasi manusia dan antisipasi atas
radikalisme di Pattani dewasa ini. Sebagai kesimpulan, Masjid Raya Pattani
tampaknya lebih terbentuk oleh gabungan para pengikut yang moderat dan
lebih konservatif dibandingkan mereka yang memiliki tendensi-tendensi radikal
dan ekstrem.
Keywords: Mosque; Islamism; Human rights; Good governance; Anticipation for
radicalism
Introduction
In Islam, masjid (mosque) is a very important institution not only as a
religious place of worship but also as a civil and social institution.2 As a
social institution, a mosque represents a reflection of society. Mosques
shape and are shaped by their congregation through a long process of
internalising the teachings of religion with their attendant social, politi-
cal, economic, and cultural factors. Although these elements may be com-
mon to all mosques, their architecture, type of congregations, adminis-
tration, voiced sermons, rituals of worship and activities may be very dif-
ferent.
It is not needed to take examples from far away to show the differen-
tiation of mosques amongst countries and continents. For instance, in
2 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘‘Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in
Thailand and Beyond”, a revised paper originally prepared for the workshop on “South-
east Asian Muslim Responses to Globalization”, Tokyo: JICA Research Institute, 2011, 6.
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Indonesia itself differentiation of mosques have occurred depending on
location (village and city), mosque affiliation to Islamic mass organisations
(Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, etc) and amongst mosques in
regions where Muslims are in majority and in those where they are in
minority.
Furthermore, differentiation of mosque can be seen from conflict
and peace situation. One striking example is the al-Aqsa Mosque affected
by the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Hence, the mosque is heavily guarded
by armed Palestinian soldiers and only Muslims can enter. Because of
this, it becomes a demonstration site for Palestine’s fighters for indepen-
dence and even Muslim pilgrims who come there buy souvenirs in the
form of plastic guns.
The horrible picture is completely different from the al-Hikmah Mosque
in the Hague, the Netherland. The mosque, which belongs to Indone-
sian Muslim community, was bought from a church. This mosque is lo-
cated in a majority non-Muslim community. In practice, the mosque is
only voicing sermons that encourage peace and tolerance. Thus there
are no hatred sermons and Muslim soldiers that guard the mosque.
Rather, non-Muslims neighbours are often invited to attend celebration
of Islamic big days and open house.
In the light of above, Gaffney3 stated that mosques everywhere are
the same because ‘all convey the recollections of eternal presence’ and at
the same time are different from each other ‘in the diversity of historical
forces that shape its distinctive personality, its form of solidarity, and its
aesthetic inclination’.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that to certain extent
tadika (kindergarten) attached to mosques, as well as Islamic boarding
3 Patrick D. Gaffney, The Prophet’s Pulpit: Islamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt, Cali-
fornia: University of California Press, 1994, 13
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schools (pondok) in southern Thailand are places that allegedly have be-
come an arena in which militant Islamic groups have spread their ideas.4
Similarly, Chalk5 described that mosques in southern Thailand have been
used by radical Islamic groups to instil radical values and even to recruit
Muslim youth to the rebellion against the Thai government.
The Kru-ze Mosque incident in 2004 was a striking example of misus-
ing mosque as a vehicle for spreading radical ideas and an arena for re-
cruiting young people as ‘martyrs’ against the Thai government. Adding
to this, the mosque itself was bombarded with bullets by the Thai troops
leaving the bullets’ trace in the mosque wall as a silent historical witness.6
Hence, Satha-Anand7 concluded in ’’Red’ Mosques: Mitigating Violence
against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond’ that Kru-ze Mosque failed
in its role as a ‘sanctuary from violence’.
The above phenomenon raises a big question concerning Islamic teach-
ing practices and management of mosques in Pattani. In other words,
what is actually wrong with the mosque’s Islamic teaching practices and
management? In addition, how mosque’s stakeholder (Imam, preachers
and congregation) perceive ideas on good governance, human rights and
4 See Crises Group Asia Report May, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad”, N
98, (ICG, 2005); Crises Group Asia Report June, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thai-
land”, N 170, (ICG, 2009).
5 Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia, Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 2009, 23-24.
6 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “The Silence of the Bullet Monument: Violence and “Truth”
Management, Dusun-Nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004" in Duncan McCargo (ed.), Rethinking
Thailand’s Southern Violence, Singapore: NUS Press, 2006; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘‘Red
Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in Thailand and Beyond”…, 6; Imtyaz
Yusuf, “Ethnoreligious and Political Dimensions of the Southern Thailand Conflict” in
Amit Pandya and Ellen Laipson (eds.), Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the
Muslim World, Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009; Sunungasil Wattana,
“Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Pattani and the 28
April 2004 Attacks”, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2006).
7 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘‘Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in
Thailand and Beyond”,...6.
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anticipation for radicalism. Such issues are pertinent with the situation
in Pattani. This article is dedicated to answer these questions by taking
Pattani Central Mosque as locus of study.
Research method
This article actually is based on my thesis research that employed ethno-
graphic approach to comprehend Islamic teaching practices and the views
of mosque stakeholders concerning good governance, human rights and
anticipation for radicalism. In this thesis research data gathering meth-
ods used are in-depth interviews and participant observation. An in-depth
interview is essentially a conversation that involves an interviewer with
an interviewee to interactively explore the interviewee’s perceptions of a
particular topic.
In the fieldwork, I used a semi-structured interview guide to prompt the
data collection. This is one of four activities required to give the inter-
view the necessary depth, which include establishing rapport (a trust rela-
tionship), asking questions in an open, emphatic way, and motivating the
interviewee to tell their story by probing.8 In relation to this, Colin9 stated
that semi-structured interviews have predetermined questions, but the
order can be modified based upon the interviewer’s perception of what
seems most appropriate. I can thus omit contextually irrelevant question
or add specific contextually relevant questions in the course of the inter-
view.
Observation is a method that enables researchers to observe and record
the behaviour, actions and interactions of a community. This method is
often used in ethnographic fieldwork to obtain a thick description of a
8 MP. Hennink & AI Bailey, (eds.) Qualitative Research Methods, Los Angeles: Sage,
2011, 109.
9 R Colin, Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner Research-
ers, 2nd Edition, Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.
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community.10 Meanwhile, in analysing data, I employed a cyclical process
of analysis11 in developing coding, description, comparison, categorisation,
conceptualisation and theory development. This research, however, is
not intended to develop a theory, but rather to give a profound analysis
of the studied mosque.
The small narratives of the mosque
This part tried to reveal a real quality of Pattani Central Mosque in terms
of Islamic teaching practices and ideas of the mosque’s stakeholders con-
cerning good governance, human rights and anticipation of radicalism.
Before discussing those matters, I will start with a brief introduction of
the Central Mosque.
Pattani central mosque
In 1964 Masjid Jami’ (Central Mosque) was built and located in Yarang,
Pattani Municipality. Basically, the mosque’s architecture adopted West-
ern style and it looks like the Taj Mahal in India. There is a big dome in
the centre, and four surrounding small ones with minarets. A big pond is
located in front of the mosque and inside there is a large hall and two
sided corridors. Also, small trees and various beautiful flowers make the
mosque look beautiful and bring peaceful tranquillity for the congrega-
tion or tourists especially in the summer season. Hence, it is no exaggera-
tion to claim that this is one of the most beautiful and largest mosques in
Thailand. To date, this mosque has become the most important centre
for religious activities of Muslims in the South. In addition, the mosque
has many activities, ranging from five prayers in a day and tadika (kinder-
garten) to organising demonstration against the Thai government.
10 MP. Hennink & AI Bailey, (eds.) Qualitative Research Methods,...201.
11 MP. Hennink & AI Bailey, (eds.) Qualitative Research Methods,...237.
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Islamic teaching practices
The five daily prayers (rawatib)
Mosques everywhere, including in Pattani, southern Thailand, are
generally dedicated places of worship, namely for the five daily prayers
and the communal Friday prayers. The Pattani Central Mosque is also
used for these needs. However, if most big mosques have crowds of wor-
shipers for regular prayers in a day (shalat rawatib), in this mosque’s size-
able numbers of worshipers are only seen for the midday (dzuhur) and
late afternoon (ashar) prayers and the prayer prior to night (maghrib). At
this mosque the number of worshippers for dzuhur, ashar and maghrib can
reach 200-300 people. However for isya prayers (at around 7.44 pm) there
are approximately 150 people, and only 20 to 25 people for dawn (subuh)
prayer.
Friday prayers and khutbah (sermons)
According to the Islamic teaching, Friday prayer is a religious obligation
to attend. One hadis says ‘if a Muslim leaves the Friday prayer three con-
secutive times without proper reasons he is not Muslim anymore’. This
can explain why Friday prayer is always attended by more Muslims than
other prayers. Some time a mosque cannot accommodate all Muslims
who come to pray because of the big numbers that show up.
Friday prayer in the mosque is usually attended by approximately 1000-
1500 Muslims, according to the Imam. This is a brief description of the
general process of the Friday prayer. Basically Friday prayer consists from
khutbah and shalat. After the first call for prayer (adzan) is done by a caller
for prayer (bilal), a preacher (khatib) that works in the day will be given a
toga and a stick and then he climbs to the pulpit. A preacher then says
Assalamu ‘alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh (Peace for you all and bless-
ing and virtue from God) and sits for a while, then the second call for
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prayer comes from a loud speaker. After that, the preacher will deliver
his first khutbah and raise the stick. The first khutbah usually takes half an
hour, then, the preacher sits for a while and then he stands again for the
second khutbah.
Usually in the fist khutbah a khatib will tell the congregation to follow
Allah and his messenger, Muhammad SAW, totally according to the Qur’an
and Sunnah. Meanwhile, in the second khutbah the preacher will come
to conclusion of the first khutbah and end it with doa (calling God for
good thing). This takes from about seven to ten minutes. After that the
preacher will lead the congregation to do the pray together. Finally, the
congregation will dismiss after the Imam leads them in reading doa and
zikir (remembering God especially mention his name).
Generally preachers in this mosque use the standard Malay language
in delivering khutbah. Sometimes they combine it with the local dialect of
Pattani. But this is very rare. Because of this, people from Malaysia and
Indonesia, like me, to some extent could understand the khutbah very
well. In terms of the content of khutbah, I found that the khutbah is only
related to religious matter.
No one of the four khutbahs that I attended in the mosque talked
about political matters. The first khutbah talked about how to nurture
children according to Islamic teaching. Then, in the second khutbah a
preacher talked about how to have good attitude (akhlakul karimah) and
practice it in daily life. The third khutbah talked about how to prepare for
the next life after this. Finally, the fourth khutbah discussed about how to
become a good Muslim not only toward other Muslims, but also toward
non-Muslims.
The three preachers told me that they are not allowed to discuss po-
litical issues, criticise the King and royal family and teach violent jihad.
Generally speaking, based on interview and observation, materials for
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Friday sermon are tafsir, qur’an, aqidah and hadis. In short, all materials
used concern religious matters. There are no indications that materials
are used that try to promote radical Islamic ideas.
Similarly, another informant told me that preachers from other coun-
tries, such as Malaysia, are not allowed to give sermons due to concern
that the sermon’s content may be related to political matters.
One of my informants told me that the preachers sometime talk about
jihad and the strengthening of Malay identity through their sermons in
several mosques in villages. But, it is very rare today. Perhaps preachers
are worried because many of them were captured as suspect and finally
were sent to jails by the state officials. Some of them, even, were killed.
For example, in 2004 there was a preacher gave a sermon on violent
jihad in one mosque in a village. Then, he was killed in another place.
Another informant added that there were at least 20 uztads killed during
the last ten years.
Ramadhan activities
The month of Ramadhan (also called the fasting month) is a special month
for Muslims everywhere, including the Muslims in Pattani. No doubt,
Muslims compete in doing amal salih (good deeds), such as prayer, give
sedekah (alms giving) and reading the Qur’an. According to Islamic teach-
ing, the first time the Qur’an was brought down to the Prophet
Muhammad was in this holy month. This month is also believed to be a
blessing month because within it there is a night (lailatul qadar) that is
worth more than a thousand months because many angels and Gabriel
and will go down during the Night by permission of the God. Peace dur-
ing the Night until the emergence of the Dawn (QS: Al-Qadar)
Every time Ramadhan comes, the mosque will be filled with many ac-
tivities. Besides five times prayers in a day, the mosque also provides sahur
(meals and drinks) before starting fasting, as well as provides iftar (meals
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and drink to break the fasting) for approximately 200-300 Muslims every
day. Also, this mosque conducts shalat tarawih (praying together after isya)
which is attended by approximately 1 thousand until 5 thousand people.
In the last ten days of the fasting month, approximately one (1) thou-
sand Muslims attend i’tikaf (stay in the mosque mostly for doing prayer
and read the Qur’an) for the last ten days. According to one informant,
this activity also is attended by students because they have vacation from
their schools in the last ten days. After the end of fasting this mosque
also conducts shalat idul fitri (prayer at the end of fasting month) which is
attended by thousands of Muslims.
Religious study group
Religious study groups are intended to teach Muslim men and women
Islamic values. This mosque also provides Islamic study groups for Mus-
lims. Generally speaking, all religious study groups in this mosque are
open to all Muslim regardless their mazhab (Islamic school of thought).
The types of religious study groups vary, and they are led by different
preachers. One religious study group that draws many members is a group
that is led by Uztad Ismail Sepanjang. During these sessions up to 700 will
attend. In his teaching, the Uztad uses book Nurul Ihsan. This group meets
regularly on Saturdays between 10 am-12 am. Another religious study
group is taught by Uztad Sahabuddin every Sunday. Approximately 400
people attend this group. In both these religious study groups women are
included.
For a mosque, contents for religious study groups are important be-
cause they will influence the understanding and attitude of the congrega-
tion. The Imam said that content of sermons are not determined by
him. It means that the preachers are free to decide their sermon themes
based on their own initiative as long as they do not teach about some-
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thing sensitive, such as jihad. In addition, they cannot talk about ikhtilaf
(opinion dispute about Islamic teaching). Materials for these religious study
groups are specific Malay books about tafsir, hadis, etc.
The method of religious study groups is lecturing. It is conducted in a
traditional way, as the preacher talks and discusses about religious mat-
ters. In practice, members of the congregation sit together in front of
the preacher and listen carefully to the content of the sermon. Based on
my observation, the preacher will recite several verses of the Qur’an and
give comments and examples. Sometime the preacher makes a joke re-
lated to the material of sermons so that the congregation is not bored
with the sermon. I observe that written sources of Islamic teaching, such
as Islamic bulletins, are not available to be distributed to congregation.
In many mosques in Indonesia congregation easily find Islamic bulletins,
such as Al-Islam that belongs to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) that strive
for establishing [Islamic] caliphate in the world. The only written sources
available here are books used in the religious study group, such as the
book entitled Nurul Ihsan that I mentioned above.
Reading quranic verses and quranic reading competitions
Reading the Qur’an is believed to give happiness and calmness to the
readers and will function as a candle or lamp that lightens their burial
after death. So, this mosque routinely conducts sessions for reading Yasin
(Qur’an verses) together every Thursday night. Reading Yasin, as the heart
of the Qur’an, will give many benefits to the readers, such as strengthen-
ing her/his belief.
 The mosque also conducts Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur’an (the Quran
Reading Competitions) that takes place in August every year. A represen-
tative of the Thai royal family will distribute the prizes for the winners. It
seems to me that involvement of the Thai royal family here to show
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their power in the region, because from the outset the mosque was estab-
lished by the King and still gets funds from the King.
Tadika (kindergarten)
Tadika derived from taman, means garden. Dee derived from Dee-de-kan,
means inculcation and Ka, derived from Kana, means children. Princi-
pally, tadika provides basic Islamic education for Muslim children outside
the elementary school. It is run by communities and is often attached to
mosques. Before 2004 tadikas did not use standard curriculums in their
teaching process. In short, tadikas function as supplement for the elemen-
tary schools run by the Thai government. According to ICG12 in the
Deep South, ‘tadika help re-inforce Malay identity. In 2007, there were
1,343 registered tadika with 3,924 teachers and 136,768 students’. Fur-
thermore, ICG13 stated that there are suspicions that ‘insurgents use tadika
foundations as fronts to funnel teachers and students into militant groups’.
The Pattani Central Mosque has a tadika that is attended by approxi-
mately 500 children, according to the Imam. The teachers of this tadika
come from Islamic boarding schools. I found that the children mostly
learn about the Qur’an, especially learn how to read it correctly. During
my fieldwork, activity of tadika can be found in many mosques and also in
houses belong to Muslim.
One interesting temporary tadika that I attended took place in a Mus-
lim house. According to its teacher, it was held for 5 days in a week from
9 am-4 pm. There were around 20 children that learned about religious
teaching and science. The language of instruction was Thai. The teach-
ers used Thai because children today speak Thai in their daily life. But in
12 Crises Group Asia Report June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand”...,
4.
13 Crises Group Asia Report June 2009, “Recruiting Militants in Southern Thailand”....
5.
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villages, based on my interview with one informant, teachings in the
tadikas are conducted in Malay language. In addition, one informant told
me that the tadikas in villages is used to teach the identity of the Pattani
Malay. In sum, I found that the tadika in the Central Mosque concen-
trates on teaching their students basic Islamic education and not on in-
stilling the identity of the Pattani Malay.
Celebration of Islamic holidays
Another activity of this mosque is the celebration of Islamic big days,
such as the birth of Muhammad SAW (Maulid), Isra Mi’raj, etc. Based on
my observation at the Mosque and interviews, the celebration of the
Birth of Muhammad is very extravagant event every year. This activity is
reported by TV in Thailand and broadcasted to several countries, such as
Malaysia. Also, it is aired by radio. This event is attended by thousands of
congregation members, as well as important guests, such as representa-
tives for the local governor, head of Thai police, etc. This event is held in
the afternoon after Ashar prayer. It takes 1 to 2 hours approximately.
The event is led by a master of ceremony who speaks in Thai and
Malay. It is started with the reciting of the Qur’an by an international
qari’ (professional reader) and followed by speeches of the local governor
and Chularajamontry or Shaikh al-Islam, of Thailand. In addition, at this
occasion there is a reading of Barazanji. The book of Barazanji was writ-
ten by Ja’far Al-Barzinji, and talk about the history of the Prophet
Muhammad Saw. and his mi’raj to sky. In addition, the interesting part
of this activity is distributing money (20 Bath) to the attendants in the
forms of small wallet and followed by eating together.
Site of demonstration
This mosque also is used to hold demonstrations. To date two big demon-
strations have taken place in the mosque, namely in 1975 and 2007. My
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informant told me that the demonstrations were not arranged by man-
agers of the mosque. They only chose this mosque because it is a strategic
place to run demonstration in. He added that these demonstrations were
organised by Muslim students from Pattani and Bangkok. The Imam
itself told me that he and its team did not involve with the last demon-
stration. In other word, neither they openly support nor prohibit using
the mosque as site of demonstration. However, it seems that the Imam
and its team supported the demonstration by not prohibiting it.
Meanwhile, a few of the former prominent figures of the last demon-
stration that I interviewed have perceived that this region will be an
independent in the future and they are working on that. Also, this young
generation are interested with the independence of the East Timor from
Indonesia and have dreamed that in the future this land of Pattani is free
and become one country like the East Timor.
Regarding the demonstration in 2007, my informant told me that
the background was a response to the Thai Government policy, because
three years after the incident in Kru-ze Mosque the Pattani people, in-
cluding uztads, imams and women faced killings, rape and oppression. In
this regard, Tengku Chik14 stated ‘Suspicion of the imam’s role in anti-
Thai insurgency has been the focus of Thai intelligence who wishes to
have the issue of religious scholar exclusively in their hands’.
Furthermore, one of the most significant tragedies amongst the many
was death of Imam Mustafa Yusof in the district of Sungai Padi. An-un-
known person or persons shotted him in the district of Sungai Padi. To
some extent, this occurred due to the Thai government enacted the
martial law and emergency degree. Hence, this demonstration aimed to
criticise and demand the Thai Government to lift the martial law and
14 Tengku Chik, TIT & TAT Chik, Pattani Cradle of the East: A History of Pattani, Thai-
land: Muslim News, 2011, 178.
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emergency decree.
Human rights watch15 notes that in responding to the January 4, 2004
raid, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra instructed, on January 5, 2004,
the application of the martial law for all districts of Pattani, Yala, and
Narathiwat. Supported by this law the Thai soldiers and police can arrest
suspects in the name of public order as well as without a judicial warrant.
Meanwhile, ‘Emergency Decree’ was enacted by Section 218 of the
1997 Constitution.16 The Decree basically declared an emergency situa-
tion in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat on July 19, 2005. Adding to this,
the Decree emerged to respond to the King’s pressure and public criti-
cism of martial law. Also, a judge criticised the Decree due to provide
justification for arresting suspects up to 100 days without trial.17 One of
the striking victims of the law of enforcement of the martial law and the
emergency decree was Imam Yapa Kaseng, killed during detention by
Army Special Task Force 39 of the Thai Government.18
The price of these laws is high. In short, there are several special laws
had been enacted in the Deep South and four districts in Songkhla in-
cluding Na Thawi, Chana, Thepha and Saba. They are: 1) Martial Law
Act B.E. 2457 (1914) (declarative effective from 5 January 2004-19 July
2005 and 19 September 2006 – present); 2) The Emergency Decree on
Government Administration in States of Emergency B.E. 2548 (2005)
(declared effective from 19 September 2006 – present, renewed every
three months) just to be applied for the provinces of Pattani, Yala and
Narathiwat; and 3) National Security Act B.E. 2550 (2007) is stated to be
15 Human Right Watch, “No One Is Safe Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s
Southern Border Provinces”, Vol.19, No. 13 (C), (2007), 33.
16 Kwanravee Wangudom, “Thailand’s States of Emergency: April – May 2010" (article
pending publication).
17  Kwanravee Wangudom, “Thailand’s States of Emergency”.
18 T Haberkorn, T.,  “When Torture is a Duty: The Murder of Imam Yapa Kaseng and
the Challenge of Accountability in Thailand” (article pending publication).
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enforced there. Furthermore, it has created confusion amongst the popu-
lation to which the laws are applied. For instance, to hold in custody
those suspected to have committed of offence, the officials may use Mar-
tial Law for detention up to seven days. The detainees can be hold for
another 30 days maximum under the Emergency Decree.19
Back to the point, the last demonstration was attended by 7000 per-
sons. These were people coming from many parts of the city, as well as
surrounding villages. In the action, most of them, including students,
used masks to hide their faces. Interestingly, the demonstration remained
non-violent and was ended peacefully.
In addition, Satha-Anand20 noted that:
The demonstration led by Muslim university students had ten demands
which include: withdraw the troops and rangers, lift the curfew in the
area, lift the emergency laws covering the four southern provinces,
hold government officials who had committed crime against the lo-
cals accountable, and refrain from arresting the innocents.
Furthermore, he regards that choosing this mosque as demonstration
site replicate the success of the peaceful demonstration 1975 and legitimise
that mosque as sanctuary against violence in southern Thailand.
View on good governance and human rights
Theoretically speaking, good governance according to Hope21 means
that:
Predictable, open, and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy im-
bued with a professional ethos; a strong civil society participating in
19 Cross Cultural Foundation, Ayah di Tangkap (My father was arrested), Thailand:
CrCF, 2009, 37-38.
20 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘‘Red Mosques: Mitigating Violence against Sacred Space in
Thailand and Beyond”…, 10.
21 Hope cited in Michael Humphrey,  HRTD 6904 “Democracy Theory and Practice on
Good Governance”, (Lecture 2, 2011).
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public affairs; adherence to the rule of law; respect for basic human
rights and freedoms; judicial independence; and consistent traditions
and predictable institutions that determine how authority is exercised
in a given nation-state.
I asked my informants about their views concerning the existing gov-
ernmental system in Thailand, and its implementation in terms of rule
of law and justice.
Generally, the majority of stakeholders agree with the existing system
of government in Thailand. In other word, they agree that there is noth-
ing wrong in the Thai system of government now. However, they have
criticised the implementation of it, in terms of the rule of law and justice.
In addition, one informant mentioned that democracy (or well-known as
constitutional monarchy) and its implementation in Thailand only ben-
efits the Central Government and marginalises the periphery such as
Pattani.
As a result, people fell oppressed by the existing system. In addition,
he added that the public space in society is closed. In other words, there is
no freedom of opinion or to articulate their opinion. And lastly, he stated
that Islamic law cannot be fully implemented in this system.
In terms of rule of law and justice, a few of my informants stated that
their implementation is weak. In practice, they perceive that law (read:
the martial law) is implemented in Pattani only to repress and suppress
the people. As an example, they told me that some uztads were captured
and sent to the jail without trial. In addition, there is no enforcement of
law when it comes to the perpetrators who have killed Muslims during
various incidents (Kru-ze Mosque, Takbai, etc).
Regarding human rights, in the preamble of the UDHR it is written
that all of the UN members will strive to build up one new world based
on ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
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justice, and peace in the world’.22
I asked my informants about equality of people, non-Muslim rights
and women’s rights. In terms of values of human rights such as equality
and rights of non-Muslims, all informants agree that there is no differ-
ence between people regardless of their religion, gender and race. So,
they argue that Muslims have no problem to live with non-Muslims in
harmony. In other words, religious tolerance is implemented here.
According to my informant, basically Muslims and Buddhists can live
together in harmony and peace. However, he added that in certain villages
when there are violent conflicts between the insurgent and Thai govern-
ment, the relationship between the groups becomes bad. In other words,
there are suspicions and prejudice amongst people of different religion.
Furthermore, there are a few informants who have an extreme un-
derstanding about the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims
in Pattani. One informant said that the relationship between Muslims
and non-Muslims cannot be fully reached, because according to Islamic
teaching, Buddhists are kafir (infidels). But, he added that in terms of
living together in daily life, for example trading with each other there is
no problem at all as long as they do not attack Muslims.
All informants argue that Muslimahs (women) have the same rights
with Muslims (man). They see women in Pattani now playing more sig-
nificant roles in social and economic life than before. They do not see
the phenomenon of women working outside their house as bad. Today,
many women have a good position in the government office and at the
university in Pattani.
View of anticipation for radicalism
In southern Thailand, since the 1990s, the emergence of Islamic radical-
22 Ann E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights Tradition and Politics, USA: Westview Press,
1999, 40-41.
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ism has strongly brought elements of separatist movement. The emer-
gence was influenced by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and
the involvement of foreign troops in many Muslim societies have radicalised
many Muslims in Thailand and raised their consciousness of global Mus-
lim grievances.23
Furthermore, from 2001 to 2003, militant groups in Pattani started
to build up a tactic to coordinate attacks on Thai government targets,
and finally this tactic peaked in the incident of 28 April 2004. On that
day, insurgents attacked 15 security posts and police stations in Pattani,
Songkhla, and Yala at the same day. This reflected insurgents applied
coordination attack that has not happened before.
Concerning anticipation for radicalism, I asked a question to the Imam
and the three preachers I interviewed in the mosque if they have any
specific strategies to anticipate radicalism in this mosque.
To date, there is no specific strategy in anticipating the rise of radical-
ism in this mosque. The management only emphasises moderate Islamic
teaching through Friday khutbahs and the materials (content) of the reli-
gious study groups. With regards to this, the Imam said that this mosque
provides Islamic teaching only related to religious matter. There is no
space for political matters or talking about ikhtilaf. Also, teaching about
jihad is not allowed in this mosque. In a similar vein, three preachers I
interviewed said that they only teach about religious issues. It means they
did not teach about violent jihad in this mosque. In addition, the preach-
ers usually promote religious tolerance in their sermons.
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